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Abstract 
 
Fifty years ago, Carl Gustav Hempel published his famous book Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation. Since then the number of publications on this subject has grown 
exponentially. An occasion like this deserves to be commemorated. In this article I offer 
a modest tribute to this great methodologist of science. 
This paper tackles the uses of explanation in theoretical sciences. In particular it 
is concerned with the possibility of causal explanations in physics. What I intend to do 
is to focus on the issue of whether the explanation of the empirical Kepler’s laws of the 
planetary motions can be a causal explanation. More specifically my point is: can the 
deductive subsumption of Kepler’s 3rd Law (also known as Kepler’s 1-2-3 law) under 
theoretical principles provide a causal explanation for the planetary motions? 
My answer is a definitive no. As a matter of fact, on occasion subsumptions 
occur under differing theoretical principles that are incompatible with one another. In 
such cases we would have incompatible scientific explanations. This is precisely the 
situation facing the scientific explanation of Kepler’s laws, in particular the third law. 
Since there exist incompatible gravitational theories, it is impossible for the scientific 
account of Kepler’s law to be a causal explanation of the planetary motions. This is just 
one example of the difficulties faced by causal explanations in sciences such as 
theoretical physics. 
 
Keywords: scientific explanation, theoretical explanation, incompatibility, causal 
explanation, Newtonian mechanics, relativity theory. 
 
 
Resumen 
 
Hace cincuenta años, Carl Hempel publicó su famoso libro Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation. Desde entonces el número de publicaciones sobre este tema ha crecido 
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exponencialmente. Una ocasión como ésta merece ser conmemorada. Así pues, en este 
artículo ofrezco un modesto homenaje a este gran metodólogo de la ciencia. 
El presente trabajo aborda los usos de la explicación en las ciencias teóricas. En 
particular se ocupa de la posibilidad de explicaciones causales en física. Lo que intento 
es centrarme en si la explicación de las leyes empíricas de Kepler de los movimientos 
planetarios puede ser una explicación causal. De modo más específico, mi problema es: 
¿proporciona la subsunción deductiva bajo principios teóricos de la 3ª Ley de Kepler 
(también conocida como ley 1-2-3 de Kepler) una explicación causal de los 
movimientos planetarios? 
Mi respuesta es, definitivamente no. En efecto, en ocasiones las subsunciones 
tienen lugar bajo principios teóricos diferentes e incompatibles entre sí. En tales casos 
tendremos explicaciones científicas incompatibles. Ésta es precisamente la situación a la 
que se enfrentan las leyes de Kepler, en particular la tercera ley. Como hay teorías 
gravitacionales incompatibles, es imposible que la explicación científica de la ley de 
Kepler constituya una explicación causal de los movimientos planetarios. Éste es solo 
un ejemplo de las dificultades a las que se enfrentan las explicaciones causales en 
ciencias como la física téorica. 
 
Palabras clave: explicación científica, explicación teórica, incompatibilidad, explicación 
causal, mecánica newtoniana, teoría de la relatividad. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In an interview with the Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang, published in the Spanish 
newspaper El País on Sunday August 2, 2015, the interviewer Pablo Guimón asks 
Chang if economics is a science. Part of Chang’s answer is: “if you think it is a science, 
you can not accept that there are two or three explanations of the same thing.” 
To give a causal explanation of something (the explicandum) means to identify 
unequivocally its cause(s). Allegedly science can provide clear grounds for events. For 
instance explanations of why eclipses occur, or why the seasons happen clearly identify 
in principle the causes of these phenomena. So we say that solar eclipses occur because 
in its rotation around the Earth, the Moon gets in the visual between Earth and the Sun. 
The moon casts shadow on Earth and obscures a strip of the same. The Sun sets in 
broad daylight. Before knowing the astronomical cause of a solar eclipse the number of 
bizarre 'explanations' that has suffered mankind has been important. To date we know 
that the seasons follow one another because of both: the tilt of the Earth –not because of 
the distance from Earth to the Sun– and the annual orbit of our planet around the sun. 
And like these we could find plenty of causal explanations in science.  
Causal explanation is explanation by reference to (efficient) causes: the 
occurrence of certain events or circumstances that motivates others to happen. We say 
that the former cause the latter. It is true that David Hume argued that it is logically 
impossible to decide, beyond any reasonable doubt, that an event causes another. But 
this position is unreasonable. Nowadays Nancy Cartwright (1989) has opposed Hume. 
For her “causality is an objective feature of our scientific image of nature” (p. 2) and 
“science needs a separate notion of causal law” (141). This position seems reasonable in 
principle. 
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Since the eighteenth century, facing Hume’s scepticism attempts by Jakob 
Bernoulli, Thomas Bayes and Pierre Simon de Laplace, followed by developments in 
theoretical statistics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries –see for example 
Rivadulla (1991)– were aimed at finding ways to model learning from experience. Or, 
in other words: to find out causes in databases. Finally, contemporary philosophy of 
science, rehabilitating the context of scientific discovery, despised by Popper, 
Reichenbach and in general by all methodologists of science until the seventies, has 
recovered abduction, inference to the best explanation, a form of reasoning –fallible of 
course– that allows to proposing the most reasonable among several competing 
hypotheses as the tentative cause of a phenomenon. Indeed, it is easy to see –on this 
subject see also Rivadulla (2015)– that from its very beginnings to the present day 
Western science has used abduction to postulate most interesting hypotheses about the 
causes of the investigated phenomena. That is, facing the paralyzing position of Hume, 
which threatened to produce the collapse of scientific practice, or convert it in a by-
product of everyday psychology, science and philosophy, walking as almost always 
hand in hand, offered ingenious and fertile alternatives to the problem of the 
investigation of causes. 
However this is not the issue that I tackle in this paper. Nor is it the aim of this 
article to restart the discussion –so often taken up in the history of philosophy– around 
the concept of causality. So, I will not refer the views of Berkeley, Duhem, Poincaré or 
Mach, even by way of illustration that the causal explanation stumbles in history upon 
significant detractors. For reasons of economy and simplicity I'm not going either to 
enter into discussions among different contemporary methodologists of science about 
the different forms and implications of the problem of scientific explanation. I will not 
even refer to the problem of determinism from the perspective of orthodox quantum 
mechanics, since there are other quantum theories that do not question the idea of 
causality.  
The question that interests me is, say, different. And it is implicit in the 
examples of causal explanation mentioned above. Indeed, these examples occult a 
problem, since we are assuming as facts both, that the Moon orbits around the Earth –
for the explanation of the solar eclipses– and that the Earth orbits, with a given 
inclination of its axis, around the Sun –for the explanation of the seasons’ succession. 
Briefly: That the Moon is a satellite of the Earth, and that the Earth is a solar planet. But 
assuming this amounts to accepting that in the context of scientific explanation, a 
reference to theories seems unavoidable. So any scientific explanation is ultimately a 
theoretical explanation. And if this is so, then the question of whether any scientific 
explanation is causal becomes secondary. 
Indeed there is no doubt to date that the Moon is a (the) satellite of the Earth, 
and that the Earth is a planet of the Sun. Pictures taken from artificial satellites situated 
conveniently far away confirm this. But until recently only the accumulation of 
observations and theoretical calculations combined with each other was what allowed to 
us reaching certainty about these truths. That is, until very recently the above mentioned 
causal explanations obtained reliability only from theoretical contexts. They were 
theoretical explanations, practically indisputable, but theoretical. And this raises the 
question whether the scientific explanation is not always –or almost always– dependent 
on the theory. If so, then the initial assumption that science provides causal explanations 
becomes problematic. 
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In Rivadulla (2004: 68) I stated that “we use the expression theoretical 
explanation of a physical construct (explanandum) when we recover the construct in 
question by mathematical deduction under a more comprehensive law or theory, which 
serves as explanans. Thus any physical construct (fact, law, hypothesis) becomes 
theoretically explained when it reappears mathematically in the context of a broader 
physical construct. So not only facts but also empirical generalizations, abstract laws, 
and even theories themselves are susceptible to theoretical explanations in the sense 
indicated.” This version of scientific explanation deviates very slightly from Hempel’s 
version, it releases specification of initial conditions, and thus it adjusts in a more 
precise form to the explanation processes in theoretical physics. Cases of theoretical 
explanations presented in Rivadulla (2004: 71-84) speak for themselves. 
 
 
2. Hempel on scientific and causal explanations 
 
Hempel’s D-N model of scientific explanation serves two purposes: 1.“[to account] for 
a particular event by subsuming it under general laws” For instance, “the principles of 
Newtonian mechanics ... explain certain ‘general facts’, i.e., empirical uniformities such 
as Kepler’s laws of planetary motion; for the latter can be deduced from the former” 
(Hempel 1965: 173-174) And  2. “to explain the fact that a given law holds by showing 
that the latter is subsumable, in the same fashion, under more comprehensive laws or 
theoretical principles” (ibid., 300) For example, “Newton’s theory of gravitation can be 
subsumed, as an approximation, under that of the general theory of relativity.” (ibid.) 
Scientific explanations are conceived, Hempel (1966: 51) thinks, as “deductive 
arguments whose conclusion is the explanandum sentence, E, and whose premise-set, 
the explanans, consists of general laws, L1, Ls,…,Lr and other statements, C1, Cs,…,Ck, 
which make assertions about particular facts.” These explanations also are called 
nomological-deductive explanations (Hempel 1966: 52): “the explanatory information 
they provide implies the explanandum sentence deductively and thus offers logically 
conclusive grounds why the explanandum phenomenon is to be expected.” 
In (1965: 174, 249) Hempel advances this model of explanation, but it is 
especially on p. 299 where he uses the expression “explanation by deductive 
subsumption under general laws, or briefly deductive-nomological explanation.” And 
on p. 335 ff. he devotes a section labelled with this title. Now, not only facts, laws are 
also eligible for a scientific explanation according to the deductive covering law 
scheme: “the method of deductive-nomological explanation accounts for a particular 
event by subsuming it under general laws ...; and it can similarly serve to explain the 
fact that a given law holds by showing that the latter is subsumable, in the same fashion, 
under more comprehensive laws or theoretical principles.” (1965: 300). In this sense, 
Hempel (1965: 343) argues both that the movement of the planets “exhibit the 
uniformities expressed by Kepler's laws … showing that these laws are but especial 
consequences of the Newtonian laws of gravitation and of motion” and that the 
Newtonian theory of gravitation can be subsumed as an approach under the general 
theory of relativity. That the explanation should be extended to laws –that is, that the 
laws themselves should be taken as explicandum– is entirely reasonable and necessary 
in science. If the laws of Kepler are taken as very nearly true, then it must be possible to 
explain why they are, that is why they offer a reasonably good description of the 
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movements of the planets. But I am not going to tackle in this paper the question of the 
scientific explanation of general laws. 
The causal explanation of the solar eclipse, for instance, conforms to Hempel’s 
D-N model: 
- The general laws are: “In a certain strip on Earth darkness happens 
when the Moon intercepts the visual line between Sun and Earth.” 
- The initial conditions consist in the astronomical positions of Sun, 
Moon and Earth relative to each other viewed from a concrete fringe on 
Earth in a given time elapse. 
  
Indeed, Hempel (1966: 349) confirms: “the causal explanation implicitly claims that 
there are general laws –let us say, L1, L2,..., Lr – in virtue of which the occurrence of the 
causal antecedents mentioned in C1, C2,...,Ck is a sufficient condition for the occurrence 
of the explanandum event. This relation between causal factors and effect is reflected in 
our schema (D-N): causal explanation is, at least implicitly, deductive-nomological.”  
Well, if scientific explanation is approached from a logical point of view, then 
deductive subsumption is simply a purely logical approach to scientific explanation. 
The causal explanation, in case you might think that it is something other than a typical 
case of scientific explanation, also fits Hempel's nomological-deductive model (Hempel 
1965: 348). In the context of explanation, says Hempel, a cause is a complex set of 
circumstances and events described by a set of statements that correspond to the initial 
conditions of the nomological-deductive reasoning scheme. According to Hempel, 
causal explanations are special types of D-N explanation (ibid., 300), and they conform 
to the D-N model (ibid., 348). However, not every D-N explanation is a causal 
explanation (ibid., 301). In particular, “the explanation of a general law by deductive 
subsumption under theoretical principles is clearly not an explanation by causes.” (ibid., 
352). Briefly, all causal explanations are deductive-nomological but not all D-N 
explanations are causal explanations. 
 
 
3. Einstein and Popper on causal explanation 
 
Karl Popper (1935: § 12) claims that “To give a causal explanation of an event means 
to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or 
more universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial conditions.” 
Since, according to Popper, “It is from universal statements in conjunction with initial 
conditions that we deduce the singular statement”, it is obvious that Popper anticipates 
Hempel’s D-N model of scientific explanation. 
At least in his early writings, Popper identifies scientific explanation with causal 
explanation. For example, in his Postscript (1983: 132), he says that “it is the aim of 
science to find satisfactory explanations of whatever strikes us as being in need of 
explanation. By an explanation (or a causal explanation) is meant a set of statements 
one of which describes the state of affairs to be explained (the explicandum) while the 
others, the explanatory statements, form the ‘explanation’ in the narrower sense of the 
word (the explicans of the explicandum).” However, in later writings identification 
between scientific explanation and causal explanation disappears. Thus, for example in 
(1972: Appendix § 6) Popper holds that an explanation is a logical deduction of the 
explicandum from certain premises (the explicans): general laws and singular initial 
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conditions. This thesis already held Popper (1963: 103): “The scientist aims at finding a 
true theory or description of the World (and especially of its regularities or ‘laws’), 
which shall also be an explanation of the observable facts. (This means that a 
description of these facts must be deducible from the theory in conjunction with certain 
statements, the so-called ‘initial conditions’.)”  
No wonder that Popper (1979, § 11, note *2) has ended realizing that his 
deductive conception of scientific explanation anticipates Hempel's deductive-
nomological model. This justifies that we should talk about the Popper-Hempel model 
of scientific explanation. Hempel mentioned only in passing (1965: 337, note 2) Section 
12 of Popper’s book, in which he anticipated his ideas. 
In his 1927 article Albert Einstein pointed out the following difference between 
Newton and Kepler from the point of view of the explanatory task of science: 
“Newton’s object was to answer the question: is there any simple rule by which one can 
calculate the movements of the heavenly bodies in our planetary system completely, 
when the state of motion of all these bodies at one moment is known? Kepler’s 
empirical laws of planetary motion, deduced from Tycho Brahe’s observations, 
confronted him, and demanded explanation. These laws gave, it is true, a complete 
answer to the question of how the planets move round the sun: the elliptical shape of the 
orbit, the sweeping of equal areas by the radii in equal times, the relation between the 
major axes and the periods of revolution. But these rules do not satisfy the demand for 
causal explanation. They are logically independent rules, revealing no inner connection 
with each other.” 
This text brings to my mind two separate ideas. The first is that Kepler's laws of 
planetary motion are empirical and that they require an explanation, all physical laws 
that come directly from the experience need to be explained, as their genesis does not 
give the required explanation. Empirical or phenomenological laws of physics are not 
themselves explanatory. This is the case of Kepler's laws, the laws of falling bodies of 
Galileo, Boyle's Law, the Stefan’s law of black body radiation, Wien's displacement 
law, or even the principles of classical or phenomenological thermodynamics. These 
laws are descriptive they tell which things happen and how they happen, but not why 
they do. In the case of Kepler's laws, it is what appears from the text of Einstein, they 
find the desired explanation in the context of Newtonian celestial mechanics. And in 
general this requirement of Einstein that empirical or phenomenological laws undergo 
an explanation evidences that the theorist is wary with the empirical or 
phenomenological beginning of science, which, as a theoretical construction must be 
deductive. Indeed, according to Einstein (1914: 221) “as long as no principles are found 
on which to base the deduction, the individual empirical fact is of no use to the theorist; 
indeed he cannot even do anything with isolated general laws abstracted from 
experience. He will remain helpless in the face of separated results of empirical 
research, until principles which he can make the basis of deductive reasoning have 
revealed themselves to him.” Thus the theoretician is satisfied only when he has been 
able to derive the results –singular or general– from a given theoretical context. This 
weakens the argument that Kant presents in the first line of his Critique of Pure Reason, 
namely: “No one can doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. ... In time, 
therefore none of our knowledge precedes experience, and all begins in it.” 
The second idea that Einstein presents is that Kepler's laws, as they were 
originally presented, do not give any causal explanation of the planetary motions. They 
are three laws logically independent from each other. This seems reasonable, because if 
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they require an explanation themselves, they could hardly offer a causal explanation of 
the events they describe. We can then raise the question whether, as a result of having 
been explained in the context of celestial Newtonian mechanics, Kepler’s empirical 
laws become themselves causal. 
 
 
4. Causal explanations. Are there any at all in theoretical science? 
 
In this section I focus on the explanation of Kepler’s Third Law. My question is: can the 
deductive subsumption of Kepler’s 3rd Law (also known as Kepler’s 1-2-3 law) under 
theoretical principles provide a causal explanation for the planetary motions? 
My main concern in this section will be to clarify this issue in line with the 
answer to the following question: Is theoretical physics itself an explanatory science? 
From this question these other emerge: 1. Does become an empirical law a causal law 
when it receives a scientific explanation? And 2. Are causal the theoretical laws of 
physics? The derivative question 1. has to do with the idea contained in the text of 
Einstein of 1927 that to the extent that the empirical laws of Kepler are explained by 
Newton, this explanation is causal. Is Einstein's position problematic? Question 2. 
requires a prior answer to the more general question, in order to clarify later on if 
scientific explanation is equivalent to causal explanation. 
In any case, Hempel (1966: 352) is sceptical about the existence of causal 
explanations: “Causal explanation in its various degrees of explicitness and precision is 
not, however, the only mode of explanation on which the D-N model has a bearing. For 
example, the explanation of a general law by deductive subsumption under theoretical 
principles is clearly not an explanation by causes. But even when used to account for 
individual events, D-N explanations are not always causal.” That is, not even for unique 
events the deductive-nomological explanations are always causal explanations, and of 
course the explanation of a law by another more general certainly is not. For instance, 
the theoretical explanation of Planck's radiation law in the framework of Bose-Einstein 
quantum statistics would not be causal. Thus, although all causal explanations are 
nomological-deductive not all nomological-deductive explanations are causal. And 
theoretical explanations of laws or theories by other broader or more general ones are 
not causal at all. Therefore Einstein’s claim that Newton gives a causal explanation of 
Kepler is arguable! But why is it so? 
Kepler's laws of planetary motions offer a very accurate description of what 
'really' occurs. That is at least what is assumed in theoretical physics, where scientists’ 
confidence in the third law –the square of the period of translation of any planet around 
the Sun is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun 3
2
2 4 a
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P
N







 – is 
out of question. This is also a much sought law in astrophysics and cosmology for its 
versatility and applicability in many circumstances, as I show in Rivadulla (2015: 111 
and 173). In this expression P denotes the orbital period of a planet around the Sun (the 
same could be true for the period of any star, for example the Sun itself, around its 
galactic centre), M is the mass of the Sun (or the total mass of a galaxy a star in the 
confines of the galaxy revolves around its centre), GN is Newton's gravitational 
constant, and a is the planet's distance from the Sun (in the case of circular orbit model 
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we are using for simplicity reasons, a is the radius of the circular orbit of the planet, or 
otherwise the distance from the star to the galactic centre).  
The derivation of this law in the framework of Newtonian mechanics, NM, in 
the more simple case of circular orbit is very elemental. For its deduction let simply be a 
binary system consisting of a body of mass M and a body of mass m separated by a 
distance r (a in the formula above) among which a balance exists between attractive 
gravitational 2r
MmGF N  and centrifugal rP
mrmamF n
2
2 2 






  forces. 
We express this balance as r
Pr
MGN 2
2
2
4
 , from which Kepler’s formula derives. 
So much this law is accepted that when in certain situations empirical data are 
opposed to it, the theoretical physicists risk to hypothesize the existence of, for 
example, dark matter to account for the observations, safeguarding the viability of the 
Kepler's third law (cf. Rivadulla 2015: 110-113). However the reliability of Kepler's 
laws rests in the first instance on observation. For this reason Einstein demanded that 
these laws should be explained themselves, and this is what Newton made. As a matter 
of fact, in the by the contemporary theoreticians considered relativistic ‘Bible’, Misner, 
Thorne and Wheeler (1973: 636) express their admiration for the work of Newton: “No 
greater glory crowns Newton’s theory of gravitation than the account it gives of the 
principal features of the solar system: a planet in its motion sweeps out equal areas in 
equal times; its orbit is an ellipse, with one focus at the sun; and the cube of the 
semimajor axis, a, of the ellipse multiplied by the square of the average angular velocity 
of the planet in its orbit ( period/2  ) gives a number with the dimensions of a 
length, the same number for all the planets, equal to the mass of the sun: 32aM  .” 
Kepler’s third law is also called by Misner-Thorne-Wheeler 1-2-3 law due to the order 
of the exponents appearing in it. 
 There is no doubt, then, the explanation of Kepler's laws –and in particular the 
third law of planetary motion– takes place by mathematical deduction applicable in the 
context of Newtonian celestial mechanics. And it follows indeed Popper-Hempel’s 
model of scientific explanation by deductive subsumption or, if you prefer, the more 
general model of theoretical explanation.  
And now we come to the key question: Provides Newton’s derivation a causal 
explanation of Kepler’s law and therefore a causal explanation of planetary motions? 
The answer to this question definitively depends on the response to the following issues: 
1. Is Newtonian mechanics the only theory able to offer a scientific explanation of 
Kepler’s laws? 2. There is besides no other gravitational theory that could apply as an 
explanation of Kepler’s laws? 
These are issues of the outmost importance, as any self-respecting theoretical 
physicist could not escape the fascinating task of trying to provide the theoretical 
explanation of Kepler’s laws by subsumption under any other competent mature theory 
in gravitational affairs. Any other mature theory has to give an explanation of Kepler’s 
laws! 
Fortunately this theory exists and fulfills the task. It is, as we know, the general 
theory of relativity (GRT). Indeed, as M-T-W (1973) claim, Kepler’s formula, Kepler’s 
law for circular orbits, 32aM  , obtains from the formula for the motion of a test 
particle in Swarzschild’s geometry described by the line element (1973: 25.12, p. 655), 
(Exercise 25.19, p. 671). We find another deduction in N. Straumann (2004: § 3.6), 
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among many others. Compared to the deduction of Kepler’s law for circular orbits in 
the framework of Newtonian theory, this is like killing flies by gunfire. But in spite of 
being very complex mathematically the deduction of law 1-2-3 in the context of GRT 
does exist. GRT would have been stillborn if it were not able to allow within it the 
mathematical derivation of Kepler’s Third Law! 
In other words, instead of one, there are two scientific explanations of Kepler's 
laws. Is this good or bad? If we recall the words of Chang, with which we began this 
article, things seem not look good for physics. We have already seen that scientific 
explanation is not necessarily causal. But, it was unclear why. Moreover, if deducing an 
empirical law like 1-2-3 in a theoretical framework should be a causal explanation, then 
every derivation of it in a different theoretical context should also provide a causal 
explanation of the law. That is, if the Newtonian explanation of Kepler’s law were 
causal, then the relativistic explanation should be causal too. And the same would 
happen for the theory of quantum gravity, or any alternative theory not yet proposed, if 
at some point it might become reality. This one would also be required to give a 
theoretical explanation of Kepler’s Law. There can be no doubt about this. 
The problem lies precisely in the causal principles assumed in every theory. For, 
if these principles were incompatible with each other then there would be as many 
causal explanations of the same phenomenon, or of the same law, as competing 
explanatory theories. The scientific and philosophical chaos would be complete! As a 
matter of fact, on occasion subsumptions occur under differing theoretical principles 
that are incompatible with one another. In such cases we would have incompatible 
scientific explanations of the same law. This is precisely the situation facing the 
scientific explanation of Kepler’s laws, in particular the third law. Since there are 
incompatible gravitational theories, it is impossible for the scientific account of 
Kepler’s law to be a causal explanation of the planetary motions 
Indeed, the ‘universal’ laws that constitute the premises (explanans) of the 
deductive argument that is the scientific explanation of Kepler’s third Law 
(explanandum) refer to efficient causes of totally different nature in the cases of NM 
and GRT: The existence of gravitational forces in the case of NM, and the curvature of 
spacetime in the case of GRT. The latter excludes the existence of gravitational forces 
acting at a distance and gives an explanation in terms of the geometry of spacetime. As 
M-T-W (1973: 649) claim: “Gravitation shows up in no way other than in curvature of 
the geometry, in which the particle moves as free of all ‘real’ force.” Thus, both theories 
deny the fundamental postulates of each other. They are incompatible with each other.  
Then, we face the following dilemma: either theoretical physics, like economics, 
as Ha-Joon Chang suspects, is not a science, because it allows the possibility of several 
incompatible explanations about the same phenomenon, or the concept of causal 
explanation in physics does not make sense. Since we can not afford to suspect that 
theoretical physics is not a science, then we must conclude that the concept of causal 
explanation is not viable in theoretical physics. If theoretical physics allows for the 
existence of several incompatible explanations of the same phenomenon, then the 
concept of causal explanation has no sense in it, unless one of the competing theories is 
wrong and the other true. But even in this case the problem is not trivial. For if we say 
that NM is false, that it has been conclusively refuted, this does not mean that we 
automatically accept that GRT is true. It will be, or will not, if it has the ability to be or 
not. But that we can never know. What would be clear is that Newton’s third law 
explanation is not causal: The explanation provided by a wrong theory cannot be causal! 
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And as a theoretical explanation it would be unsatisfactory. So Einstein's assumption 
that the Newtonian explanation of Kepler's law is a causal explanation of the planetary 
motions is highly arguable. 
We could still complicate the situation if we turn to the theory of quantum 
gravity and the existence of such hypothetical entities called gravitons, and we would 
start over again. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Talking of causal explanations introduces of course a fascinating element in our 
expectations about science because it channels the scientific activity through the path of 
the search of the form of things themselves, of being able to get in touch with reality 
and to give a complete and accurate description of how and why the world is as it looks 
like. All of which is part of the efforts of the old metaphysics. 
But science, particularly theoretical physics, is more modest. It has no more 
pretensions than to put at our disposal tools –theoretical models and theories– to deal 
with, and intervene in, Nature with a success always moderate. It makes sense to 
dispense with the search for causal explanations in science.  
In any case, and bearing in mind that when we make a not too problematic use 
of the term causal explanation there is always implied –more or less clearly– a 
reference to theory, then all scientific explanations – including causal explanation – is 
ultimately a theoretical explanation. That is, all causal explanation is theoretical, but 
not all theoretical explanation is causal. I completely agree with Hempel that scientific 
explanations are not necessarily causal. Then we should renounce definitely to give 
causal explanations in theoretical physics.  
Not wanting to draw the conclusion, that it would be exaggerated, that 
theoretical physics is not a science, it seems most reasonable to renounce in the field of 
scientific explanation to causal explanations –explanations by reference to efficient 
causes– in favour of the theoretical explanations –explanations in a given theoretical 
framework. Theoretical explanations are certainly less glamorous than causal 
explanations. And they also have an added cost: that we must renounce that all scientific 
explanations in principle are true, which means that, once accepted as such, they would 
be true once and for all and forever. But there is no other way out. 
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